virtio-serial: Don't copy over guest buffer to host
When the guest writes something to a host, we copied over the entire buffer first into the host and then processed it. Do away with that, it could result in a malicious guest causing a DoS on the host. Reported-by: Paul Brook <paul@codesourcery.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
		
							parent
							
								
									6bff86560d
								
							
						
					
					
						commit
						471344db88
					
				@ -132,16 +132,17 @@ static void do_flush_queued_data(VirtIOSerialPort *port, VirtQueue *vq,
 | 
			
		||||
    assert(virtio_queue_ready(vq));
 | 
			
		||||
 | 
			
		||||
    while (!port->throttled && virtqueue_pop(vq, &elem)) {
 | 
			
		||||
        uint8_t *buf;
 | 
			
		||||
        size_t ret, buf_size;
 | 
			
		||||
        unsigned int i;
 | 
			
		||||
 | 
			
		||||
        buf_size = iov_size(elem.out_sg, elem.out_num);
 | 
			
		||||
        buf = qemu_malloc(buf_size);
 | 
			
		||||
        ret = iov_to_buf(elem.out_sg, elem.out_num, buf, 0, buf_size);
 | 
			
		||||
        for (i = 0; i < elem.out_num; i++) {
 | 
			
		||||
            size_t buf_size;
 | 
			
		||||
 | 
			
		||||
        port->info->have_data(port, buf, ret);
 | 
			
		||||
        qemu_free(buf);
 | 
			
		||||
            buf_size = elem.out_sg[i].iov_len;
 | 
			
		||||
 | 
			
		||||
            port->info->have_data(port,
 | 
			
		||||
                                  elem.out_sg[i].iov_base,
 | 
			
		||||
                                  buf_size);
 | 
			
		||||
        }
 | 
			
		||||
        virtqueue_push(vq, &elem, 0);
 | 
			
		||||
    }
 | 
			
		||||
    virtio_notify(vdev, vq);
 | 
			
		||||
 | 
			
		||||
		Loading…
	
	
			
			x
			
			
		
	
		Reference in New Issue
	
	Block a user