a9b4942f48
Add a new memory encryption object 'sev-guest'. The object will be used
to create encrypted VMs on AMD EPYC CPU. The object provides the properties
to pass guest owner's public Diffie-hellman key, guest policy and session
information required to create the memory encryption context within the
SEV firmware.
e.g to launch SEV guest
# $QEMU \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
-machine ....,memory-encryption=sev0
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
110 lines
4.5 KiB
Plaintext
110 lines
4.5 KiB
Plaintext
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors.
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SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted
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virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages
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(code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the
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unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption
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key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the
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encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible
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data.
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The key management of this feature is handled by separate processor known as
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AMD secure processor (AMD-SP) which is present in AMD SOCs. Firmware running
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inside the AMD-SP provide commands to support common VM lifecycle. This
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includes commands for launching, snapshotting, migrating and debugging the
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encrypted guest. Those SEV command can be issued via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
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ioctls.
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Launching
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---------
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Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before guest can be booted.
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MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images :LAUNCH_START,
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LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands
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together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot
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images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of the
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successful launch.
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LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within
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the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provides guest policy,
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its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs
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should be treated as binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware.
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The guest policy is passed as plaintext and hypervisor may able to read it
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but should not modify it (any modification of the policy bits will result
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in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing
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several flags that restricts what can be done on running SEV guest.
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See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
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The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below)
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# ${QEMU} \
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sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\
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Guest owners provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to
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establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used
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for the attestation.
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The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via 'dh-cert-file' and
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'session-file' property (see below
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# ${QEMU} \
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sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2>
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LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context
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created via LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called
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multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates
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the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts.
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LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted
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memory. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be
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sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted
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correctly by the firmware. The guest owner may wait to provide the guest
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confidential information until it can verify the attestation measurement.
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Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the
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attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
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expects.
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LAUNCH_FINISH command finalizes the guest launch and destroy's the cryptographic
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context.
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See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
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complete flow chart.
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To launch a SEV guest
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# ${QEMU} \
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-machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0 \
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-object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1
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Debugging
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-----------
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Since memory contents of SEV guest is encrypted hence hypervisor access to the
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guest memory will get a cipher text. If guest policy allows debugging, then
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hypervisor can use DEBUG_DECRYPT and DEBUG_ENCRYPT commands access the guest
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memory region for debug purposes. This is not supported in QEMU yet.
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Snapshot/Restore
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-----------------
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TODO
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Live Migration
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----------------
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TODO
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References
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-----------------
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AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:
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http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
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Secure Encrypted Virutualization Key Management:
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[1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf
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KVM Forum slides:
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http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
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AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
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http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
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SME is section 7.10
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SEV is section 15.34
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